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Abstract This paper presents a hybrid cryptographic 
protocol, using quantum and classical resources, to 
generate a key for authentication and optionally for 
encryption in a network.  One or more trusted servers 
distribute streams of entangled photons to individual 
resources that seek to communicate. An important 
class of cheating by a compromised server will be 
detected. Each resource shares a previously 
distributed secret key with the trusted server, and 
resources can communicate with the server using 
both classical and quantum channels.  Resources do 
not share secret keys with each other, so that the key 
distribution problem for the network is reduced from 
to .  Some advantages of the protocol are 
that it avoids the requirement for timestamps used in 
classical protocols, guarantees that the trusted server 
cannot know the authentication key, can provide 
resistance to multiple photon attacks  [Brassard et 
al., 1999; Felix et al., 2001] and can be used with 
BB84 [Bennett84] or other quantum key distribution 
protocols.   
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1 Introduction 
 
Controlling access to a large network of resources is 
one of the most common security problems.  Familiar 
examples of authentication include the process of 
supplying a password to gain access to a computer, or 
use of a personal identification number (PIN) with an 
automatic teller machine.  The user seeking 
authentication must provide some ticket that cannot 
be held by anyone else, either because user and 
system shared the secret at some point in the past, or 
both received the secret from some trusted third party 
with assurance that the communication was not 
intercepted. 
 
Any pair of parties in a network should be able to 
communicate, but must be authorized to do so, which 
requires that their identities be authenticated.  The 
fundamental problem is how to authenticate 
resources to each other while minimizing the number 
of cryptographic keys that must be distributed and 
maintained, given the potential for  pairs of 
communicating resources.  Conventional solutions are 
typically based on authentication protocols such as 
Kerberos or public key schemes, which use trusted 
servers to grant authentication tickets or certificates to 
the communicating parties.  Less sophisticated 
examples include the use of simple passwords on a 
network.  Password or authentication key transmission 
may or may not be encrypted, depending on the level 
of risk. 
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This paper describes a solution based on a combination 
of quantum cryptography and a conventional secret key 
system (although a public key system could be used for 
the classical component as well).  A novel feature of 
this approach is that even the trusted server cannot 
know the contents of the authentication ticket.  Using 
quantum cryptography also avoids the need for 
timestamps and key expiration periods.  
 
1.1 Protocol Description 
 
This section describes the protocol (illustrated in 
Figure 1) under idealized conditions.  A later section 
discusses the impact of transmission losses, detection 
rates and other limiting factors of physical 
implementations.  We assume that each resource shares 
a secret key with a trusted server that an eavesdropper 
can read but not modify messages, and that resources 
can communicate with the trusted server over a 
classical and quantum channel.  For the discussion 
below, it is assumed that the trusted server can be, in 
fact, trusted.  A subsequent section describes a 
modification to the protocol that allows detection of a 
compromised server. 
 
1. On the classical channel Alice sends a 
message to the trusted server, Tr, encrypted 
under Alice’s secret key, indicating the party, 
Bob, that Alice seeks to communicate with.  
(A classical communication channel is 
suggested here, but the only requirement is 
that parties be able to communicate securely 
with the trusted server.  Any form of secure 
communication could be used.  Authentication 
between Alice and the trusted server is also 
required, and can be accomplished through a 
variety of existing classical protocols that are 
not described here. ) 
2. Using the secret keys shared with Alice and 
Bob, Tr sends to Alice and Bob the location, 
basis, and polarization of tamper detection 
bits. 
3. On the quantum channels Tr sends a stream 
of k pairs of authentication key bits along 
with d pairs of randomly interspersed tamper 
detection bits.  Each key bit is one half of an 
entangled pair of photons in the state 
( )1100
2
1 +=+Φ . 
4. One photon of each pair goes to Alice and 
its twin to Bob.  The tamper detection bit 
pairs are polarized randomly, according to a 
sequence of randomly selected bases.  Each 
photon in a pair is polarized in the same 
direction as the other; one is sent to Alice 
and its twin to Bob.  
 
5. Alice and Bob measure key photons 
according to a pre-determined basis, known 
to all communicating parties, and tamper 
detection photons according to the sequence 
of bases received from Tr, producing a 
sequence of authentication key bits and 
tamper detection bits.  That is, a 
measurement result of 0  is treated as a 
key bit of 0 and a measurement result of 
1  is treated as a key bit of 1. 
  
Key bits measurement: Since the key bits are 
entangled, Bob will observe the same 
measurement seen by Alice.   
  
Tamper detection bits measurement: With 
zero transmission loss and perfect detection, 
the tamper detection bits will match Tr’s 
message with 100% accuracy.  If an 
eavesdropper, Eve, has read the message the 
error rate for tamper detection bits will be 
25%, since she has a 50% chance of 
guessing the correct basis, and a 50% chance 
that Alice and Bob will measure the correct 
polarization even if Eve chooses the wrong 
basis.  In a practical implementation, the 
error threshold for tamper detection bits 
should be set as close to 0 as practical, for 
reasons discussed in a subsequent section.  If 
the error rate for tamper detection bits 
exceeds the error threshold, the protocol is 
restarted. 
  
6. To authenticate her identity to Bob, Alice 
sends to Bob the result of measuring the key 
bit sequence to provide confidence (with 
probability 1 ) that the message is from 
Alice.  The authentication key effectively 
serves as a session password, which is sent 
in the clear.  Note that Alice may send only a 
portion of the key bit sequence, sufficient to 
authenticate her identity, while retaining the 
rest to be used as a shared secret key.  That is, 
the protocol can incorporate key distribution 
as well as authentication.  
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7. Bob compares his measurement of the photon 
stream received from Tr with the result sent 
by Alice.  A perfect match authenticates 
Alice.   
 
 
After step 6, Alice and Bob share a bit sequence 
resulting from their measurement of the key photons, 
and even Tr cannot know the bit sequence for the bits 
that were measured because the measurement result is 
not transmitted.  Note also that after step 6, Eve will 
gain nothing by decrypting communications between 
the trusted server and Alice and Bob, because knowing 
the location of tamper detection bits is of no value after 
measurements are made on the key bits.  This 
information needs to be protected for only a few 
seconds or milliseconds, making it possible – with 
sufficient key length – to resist attacks from even a 
quantum computer.   
 
At the end of an exchange, some portion of Alice and 
Bob’s shared bit sequence might be used as an 
encryption key as well, although doing so involves 
greater risk than using the bits as an authentication key 
because leaking partial information can make the key 
vulnerable. Privacy amplification techniques might be 
used to reduce Eve’s information in this case [Bennett 
et al., 1995]. More on the potential for Eve guessing bit 
values is discussed in following sections. 
 
1.2 Detecting a Compromised Server 
 
The previous discussion assumed that the server could 
be trusted.  However, if the server were compromised, 
it could send matching qubits to Alice and Bob, in 
place of entangled pairs.  Since Alice and Bob measure 
their qubits individually, they would have no way of 
recognizing that the qubits received from Tr were not 
entangled, and therefore could not detect the fact that 
the server could have retained a copy of their bit 
streams.  An addition to the protocol, using 
entanglement swapping [Zukowski et al., 1993; 
Cabello, 2000; Song, 2003], will prevent this attack, 
ensuring that the bit stream developed by Alice will not 
authenticate with Bob, to an arbitrarily high 
probability.  The protocol proceeds as described 
previously, with Step 5 replaced as follows: 
 
Step 5:   
5a.  For each qubit received from Tr, Alice prepares 
an entangled pair in a random Bell state, S , where 
S  is one of the conventional Bell states 
( ) 2/1100 ±=Φ ±  and ( ) 2/1001 ±=Ψ ± . 
 If the server is operating as expected, the qubits 
received by Alice and Bob are in the state 
( lklkAB 110021 +=+Φ ), where qubit Qk  is the 
qubit received by Alice and Q  is the qubit received 
by Bob.  
l
 
5b.  With the combined system S ⊗ +Φ AB
j
l
Alice 
executes a Bell basis measurement on (which she 
received from Tr) and qubit Q  that she created.  As 
a result of this measurement, Alice’s qubit  
becomes entangled with the qubit Q  that Bob 
received from Tr.  Because she knows the initial state 
of her created qubits Q  and , her result from 
measuring  and Q , and the state of qubits sent 
from Tr, Alice can determine the state of the now 
entangled qubits Q  and .  Using the state of  
and , and the result of her measure of Q  and 
, the entangled state of Q  and Q  can be 
determined from Table 1 below: 
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 Result of measuring Q  Q  j k
State of 
iQ  Q  j
+Φ  −Φ  +Ψ  −Ψ  
+Φ  +Φ  −Φ  +Ψ  −Ψ  
−Φ  −Φ  +Φ  −Ψ  +Ψ  
+Ψ  +Ψ  −Ψ  +Φ  −Φ  
−Ψ  −Ψ  +Ψ  −Φ  +Φ  
Table 1.  Entanglement of  and Q  iQ l
 
For example, if  and  are created in state  Φ  
and the result of her measurement on Q  and Q is 
, then she knows that Q  and  will then be in 
state , or if Q  and are in , then Q and 
 must also be in . 
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5c.  Alice now measures her qubit .  When Bob 
measures his corresponding qubit, , his result will 
be either correlated or anti-correlated with Alice’s 
result from measuring Q .  Alice establishes her key 
bit accordingly:  
 
iQ   Q
state 
 result Key bit 
+Φ or Φ   0 
+Φ or Φ   1 
+Ψ  or   1 
+Ψ  or   0 
 
5d.  Bob waits to measure his qubits until a 
transmission is received from Alice.  At this point, he 
measures and sets key bits as described in section 1.1.  
If the qubits received from Tr were in fact entangled, 
then Alice and Bob now share a common bit sequence 
not known to Tr or other parties. 
 
Suppose now that Tr has been compromised and it 
attempts to record a copy of Alice and Bob’s shared bit 
sequence by sending non-entangled random qubits to 
Alice and Bob, recording the sequence sent.   In this 
case, the combined system at step 5b is x , 
with x either 0 or 1.  Since Alice creates one of the four 
Bell states randomly, the Bell state measurement of 
 and Q will result in a Φ  or Ψ state with equal 
likelihood, and the generated key bit will match or not  
k
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State of 
  jQ
kQ  and Q
sent by Tr 
l Measurement 
 and Q  jQ k
Resulting
key bit 
x  ±Φ  x  ±Φ  
x  ±Ψ  x  
x  ±Φ   ±Ψ  
x  ±Ψ  x  
x
Table 2.  Key bits with compromised server 
match Bob’s key bit with probability .50.  For example, 
if Alice generates +Ψ  and Tr sends 0 , then the 
combined state is +Ψ ⊗ 0 .  If the result of 
measuring is  and  is Φ  then Q  will be 
measured as 
jQ kQ
±
l
1
− 2
 and Alice’s key bit will be 1.  Since 
the qubits sent by Tr are not entangled, the value of 
Bob’s qubit is  the 0 bit sent by the compromised 
server.    So Alice’s key bit value will match Bob’s 
key bit value with only probability .50.  Alice’s 
authentication key will therefore be rejected with 
probability , for n key bits.  So the copy 
made by the compromised Tr could not be used for 
authentication. 
n−1
 
Another server-based attack is possible using GHZ 
state qubits.  If the server can create three qubits in 
GHZ state, retaining one and forwarding the others to 
Alice and Bob, it could develop a copy of their key 
bit stream.  However, this attack is in a distinctly 
different risk category than the attack described 
previously.  The attack using matched non-entangled 
qubits could conceivably be accomplished remotely, 
across a network, by modifying the software 
controlling the server.  But the server could not be 
simply reprogrammed to generate GHZ state qubits, 
since more sophisticated equipment would be 
required.  This attack would require physical access 
to the server, to install equipment capable of 
generating GHZ states, so it could be mitigated by 
conventional physical security. 
 
Another possibility is that the compromised server 
could forge a message from Alice to Bob. Since the 
server has access to the original secret keys shared 
with each user, the modifications to step 5 do not 
prevent this attack, but they do prevent the server 
from copying a key used for encryption, rather than 
authentication. 
 
 
2 Analysis of Security Properties 
 
This section considers possible attacks against the 
protocol and examines parameters required for a 
desired level of security. 
2.1 Intercept-resend attack 
 
Suppose that Eve intercepts the photon stream going 
to either Alice or Bob, and resends.  In this case, she 
must guess the basis for the tamper detection bits, 
guessing incorrectly 50% of the time.  Alice  (or Bob) 
will measure the tamper detection bits according to 
the basis sent by Tr.  If the tamper detection bits have 
not been measured by Eve, then the polarization 
measured by Alice will agree with that sent by Tr 
100% of the time and Alice will observe an error rate 
of 0.  If the tamper detection bits have been measured 
by Eve, then Alice will observe an error rate of .25.   
 
Guessing which bits are for tamper detection and 
which for the authentication key is not a feasible 
strategy.  Tamper detection bits are interspersed 
randomly, so the chance of picking the correct  key 
bits out of 
k
dk + bits is , which will be 
extremely small for reasonable values of and , 
where  is the number of authentication key bits and 
 the number of tamper detection bits.  Eve could try 
guessing a subset of the bits, hoping to get all  key 
bits without disturbing the tamper detection bits.  The 
chance of this strategy succeeding for guessing a total 
of g bits is a product of the probability of getting all  
key bits and the probability of disturbing a tamper 
detection bit: 
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Eve has a tradeoff in that increasing the number of 
guessed bits, g, increases her chances by making it 
more likely to get all k key bits, but decreases them by 
raising the probability that an error detection bit will be 
disturbed, thus revealing her presence. Overall, Eve’s 
chances of success increase as more bits are guessed.  
Reading an extra bit will increase the left side of the 
product by a factor of 
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Since , kg > 1
1
1 >−+
+
kg
g , but the right side will 
decrease by a factor of only 0.75 for each extra bit 
guessed.  Therefore Eve’s chances improve as long as 
175.0
1
1 >⋅−+
+
kg
g , or up to a limit of 14 −< kg
D
.  As 
shown below, this limit is not reached if the 
probability of falsifying an authentication token and 
the probability of evading detection of eavesdropping 
are balanced.  The best strategy for Eve, then, is to 
measure all bits and hope that the measurement does 
not induce an error detectable by Alice and Bob.  
Measuring all bits gives a chance of evading 
detection of . . d75
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Suppose we wish to ensure a probability of no more 
than of an intruder falsifying an authentication 
token, and  of evading detection of 
eavesdropping.    The protocol has the perhaps 
unexpected property that more tamper detection bits 
are required than key bits, if we want to ensure that 
 and  are approximately equal.   As described 
above,  and .  Let D =  = 
.   
e
d
eD 75.= a
Then  
Dk  and 
75.ln
ln Dd =  
 
so  4.2=
k
d .1  
A persistent problem in quantum communication 
implementations is the difficulty of achieving single 
photon states.  Signals normally contain zero, one, or 
multiple photons in the same polarization.  The 
multiple photon splitting, or photon number splitting, 
attack on quantum protocols involves the eavesdropper 
deterministically splitting off one photon from each 
multi-photon signal [Brassard et al., 1999; Huttner et 
al., 1995].  If Eve measures every single photon and 
passes along n-1 photons undisturbed from each multi-
photon state, then her chances of evading detection are 
increased because the number of tamper detection bits 
that are effective is reduced to , where  is 
the probability of a single photon state, and the chance 
of evading detection becomes 0 .   Defending 
against this attack requires increasing the number of 
tamper detection bits by a factor of  to reduce the 
chance of evading detection to an acceptable level. 
dpd 1'≈
'75. d
1
−p
1p
1
 
Values for k and d needed to implement a required 
level of security D are  
 
 DDk ln44.12ln
ln

−=   and 
 
d 48.3−=  
  
A reasonable level of security for many applications, 
with D approximately10 , can then be implemented 
with  k = 17 and d = 41. 
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2.2 Distinguishing tamper detection bits 
 
If Eve can distinguish the tamper detection bits from 
other bits, she can avoid detection by leaving them 
undisturbed.  However, the location of the tamper 
detection bits is protected using the symmetric keys 
shared by Tr and the two parties.  Eve would need to 
decrypt this information in real time, only a few 
seconds or milliseconds, for it to be useful because it 
is of no value after Alice and Bob have completed 
their measurements.  Physical means cannot be used 
to distinguish between entangled and non-entangled 
bits if Eve has access to only one path (Tr-Alice or Tr-
Bob), and thus only one of each pair, because the 
ability to do so would imply faster than light 
communication.   
 
2.3 Multiple photon splitting 
 
2.4 Denial of service 
 
The ability to write to or disconnect any channel would 
allow an attacker to disrupt communication, but this 
weakness is inherent in any non-redundant 
communication system.  The protocol is therefore 
suited to networks where channels are assumed to be 
observable, but cannot be jammed or disconnected. 
 
 
 
3 Related Work 
 
Zeng and Guo [2000] also describe an authentication 
protocol based on using entangled pairs.  Their 
protocol uses previously shared secret keys (between 
each pair of parties) to establish a sequence of 
measurement bases, and relies on measurement of error 
rates, as in BB84, to detect the presence of 
eavesdropping.  Jensen and Schack [2000] present a 
revised version of Barnum’s [1999] quantum 
identification using catalysis. Dusek et al. [1998] 
combine a classical authentication protocol with 
quantum key distribution. 
 
 
4 Conclusions and Future Work 
 
This paper describes a protocol for authenticating 
resources in a network using properties of quantum 
entanglement.  The protocol has a number of 
advantages over both classical authentication 
protocols and other quantum protocols.  
Incorporating conventional symmetric cryptography 
allows eavesdropping detection to be separated from 
key distribution, rather than relying strictly on error 
rates of transmitted keys to detect intrusions.  
However, an intruder would have only a few seconds 
or milliseconds to decrypt classically encrypted 
transmissions between trusted server and 
workstations. 
 
As described, the protocol relies on idealized 
properties, and practical implementations may face 
constraints on transmission efficiency resulting from 
current technology constraints.   The next step 
required for realization of the protocol is a thorough 
analysis of effects of these constraints.  In particular, 
multiple rounds of photon distribution between the 
trusted server and network resources are likely to be 
required as a result of limits on detection efficiency.  
Measurements of the efficiency of current 
implementation schemes, particularly parametric 
down conversion and weak coherent pulse methods, 
will be needed.   
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Figure 1.  Protocol diagram 
